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Time-symmetric cosmological theories, in which the initial and final states are
arranged to have similar features or are independently fixed, have been quite ex-
tensively discussed in the literature. However, a more general and perhaps more
useful possibility seems, surprisingly, never to have been considered. Quantum
cosmology, like any inherently probabilistic dynamical theory, can be modified by
conditioning on the occurrence of a sequence of cosmological events fixed a priori
and independently of the hamiltonian and initial state. These more general the-
ories provide a natural class of alternatives which should eventually be useful in
quantifying how well the hypothesis that initial conditions suffice is supported by
the data.
1 Introduction
Standard quantum theory is explicitly time asymmetric. The quantum state
|ψ(t)〉 of a system at any time t is defined entirely by past events. It carries
all the information that there is about the probabilities of future measurement
outcomes on the system, but not about the probabilities of past measurement
outcomes: to estimate the latter, we need some information about the state of
the system prior to the measurements.
The same is true of standard quantum cosmological models: the initial
conditions are taken to be fixed and simple; the probability of any given cos-
mological event is then determined by the initial conditions and (in interpre-
tations which assign probabilities to sequences of events) by earlier events.
If standard quantum cosmology gives essentially the right picture, then the
time asymmetry of quantum theory ultimately derives from this cosmological
asymmetry.
The hypothesis that initial causes suffice is simple, natural, attractive,
unifying and confirmed by the many successes of existing cosmological theory.
Present data does not hint that there may be any need to go beyond it. So it
looks perverse to spend serious effort building cosmological theories in which
the hypothesis does not hold — unless these theories have some great, as yet
unappreciated, advantage. It may perhaps seem perverse even to mention
alternatives at all. Still, however sure we are of a physical principle, it’s always
interesting to ask whether it absolutely has be true and how well it can be
confirmed.
The most obvious alternative to the standard time asymmetric picture is
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a time symmetric cosmology. Classical cosmologies with some form of time
symmetry have been discussed by several authors.1−3 Gell-Mann and Hartle4
have recently shown how to define time-symmetric (or time-neutral) quantum
cosmologies, in which the initial and final states are fixed independently of
each other and of the hamiltonian. The hamiltonian continues to play a well-
defined roˆle, but the probabilities of cosmological events are no longer defined
by the hamiltonian and initial state alone: they depend symmetrically on the
fixed initial and final states.
2 Quantum Cosmologies Constrained by more than Boundary Con-
ditions
Time-neutral cosmologies have some surprising features,5 but they are inter-
nally consistent theories which (in principle) make distinct empirical predic-
tions, and have been proposed as foils against which to test the standard
understanding of time asymmetry. However, it is hard to find examples of
time-neutral cosmologies with any theoretical appeal at all except in closed
universe scenarios in which there is recontraction to a final singularity. It is
hard (though perhaps not impossible) to find tests that would allow us to dis-
tinguish time-asymmetric and time-neutral closed universe cosmologies. And
the data do not currently seem to favour a closed universe. In short, there is
currently really no very serious time-symmetric alternative to standard ideas
— and unless one is found, the discussion may never really affect practical
cosmology. Time (or CPT) symmetry in the boundary conditions is a natural
idea in its way, but to implement it seems to require a very large step from
our current picture. Time-neutral cosmologies may unfortunately thus be of
limited use as foils — small perturbations of successful theories are generally
more useful than large ones in this roˆle.
Focussing on the boundary conditions, though, misses the fact that quan-
tum cosmology — or the quantum theory of any closed system, or indeed any
probabilistic dynamical theory — can be modified by imposing any of a large
class of dynamical constraints. In essentially the same way as the predictions
of a classical stochastic differential equation can be modified by restricting to
the sub-ensemble of solutions which satisfy particular constraints at various
times, a standard quantum cosmology can be modified so that sequences of
events from some fixed sub-class of possibilities necessarily take place. Quite
generally, given any initial state |ψ(t0)〉 and hamiltonian H , we can, if we wish,
define a theory by hypothesising that events corresponding to the projections
P1, P2, . . . , Pn take place at times t1 < t2 < . . . < tn, for any n ≤ ∞, and then
calculate the probabilities of other events conditional on this hypothesis — so
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long as the probability of the sequence of Pi occurring under free evolution of
|ψ(0)〉 by H would have been non-zero.
Now, if the present time t > tn, it is true that the probabilities of present
events could equally well be calculated, for example, from the hypothesis that
the initial state was
|ψ′(tn)〉 = Pn exp(iH(tn − tn−1))Pn−1 . . . P1 exp(iH(t1 − t0))|ψ(t0)〉 (1)
at time tn. The idea here, though, is that |ψ(t0)〉 and the Pi should be relatively
simple, and |ψ′(tn)〉 rather obviously more complicated and derivative, in the
sense that its occurrence in a theory can only elegantly be explained via Eq. 1
and the originally stated hypothesis.
Instead of projections, of course, any of the more complicated notions of
quantum event discussed, for example, in the consistent histories literature may
be used. Of these, covariant notions of event defined via path integrals seem
fundamentally the most satisfactory and best adapted to quantum cosmology.
It would be possible, thus, for example, to define quantum cosmologies in
which we stipulate in advance that, when the compact 3-metric has volume Vi,
the matter inhomogeneities are of scale δi, for some sequence V1 < V2 < . . ..
There are, of course, infinitely many theories of this type, including quite
simple ones. Since, apart from the imposed constraints, they preserve all
of standard physics, and need not differ greatly from standard theories in
their predictions, they seem ideally designed as foils against which to test the
fundamental postulate that initial causes suffice.
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